We explore the positioning of Australian political parties at the 2001 federal election using data from the Australian Election Study and discuss some of the strategic implications. We focus on some of the attitudes of Senate voters for the various parties, concentrating on how Inglehart's postmaterialism measures and a measure of postmodern attitudes can be used to supplement more traditional Left-Right descriptions of the party system. We find that descriptions based on a single Left-Right dimension are inadequate but that attitudes on this dimension and on a postmaterialism or postmodernism dimension are correlated, thus creating constraints for parties. We use comparisons with the 1998 election to assess the stability of the structure and the significance of the electoral context, and generally find that the structure was stable between the two elections.
Introduction
The question of how best to describe and explain changes in the Australian party system has assumed a good deal of significance since the advent of the One Nation Party (ONP) following the election of Pauline Hanson at the 1996 federal election (after she had been disendorsed during the election campaign by the Liberal Party). However, broader questions about the nature of developments in the party system have, of course, been around for much longer than this in the post-Second World War period, beginning with the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in the 1950s. Later on, and following the decline of the DLP, they again became prominent after the formation of the Australian Democrats in 1977. The development of various regional Green parties (and the subsequent formation of the Australian Greens) has been another significant feature.
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in Europe, where Green and populist anti-migrant parties have achieved a fair deal of electoral success in some countries. One of the most influential accounts of related factors in the international context has been provided by Ronald Inglehart (1977 , although his argument is not restricted to electoral politics. His earlier account draws on Maslow's theory of a needs-hierarchy to argue that postmaterialism will play an increasing role; more recently (Inglehart 1997) he has broadened his argument into a consideration of 'postmodernisation'.
Inglehart claims that a fundamental shift is taking place in value orientations in modern societies, from an emphasis on traditional priorities maximising economic and physical security to postmodern priorities maximising subjective well-being (Inglehart 1997, 86) . He argues that this value shift is reflected in higher interpersonal trust, tolerance and permissiveness and the increasing prioritisation of a range of issues such as environmental protection, abortion, ethnic diversity, women's issues, and gay and lesbian emancipation (Inglehart 1997, 4, 132, 237, 246) . The rise of postmaterial values, emphasising self-expression (including political participation) and quality-of-life issues (such as freedom, democracy, beauty and the importance of ideas), is one component of this changing orientation that he argues has an important impact in the political realm.
In the Australian context, the increase in the vote for the Australian Democrats at the 1990 federal election combined with the apparent significance of environmental issues in that campaign to raise the question of the influence of postmaterialism on voting in Australia to some prominence. Gow (1990, 71) , however, concluded that 'economic voting provides a more coherent account of non-Labor voting in the 1990 election'. Part of his argument relied on the extent of first-preference votes for the minor parties and, in that context, we can observe that the combined House of Representatives vote for the ALP and the Liberal-National coalition, which had hovered around 90% between 1955 and 1972 (and reached as high as 96% in 1975) had fallen to around 80% in both 1998 and 2001.
In more recent analyses, some aspects of Gow's approach are criticised by Blount (1998) , who argues that the postmaterialist effect actually manifests itself in the Senate vote for minor parties. In turn, Western and Tranter (2001) criticise some of Blount's analytical techniques and use multinomial logistic regression to find that postmaterialists vote disproportionately for both the Australian Democrats and the Greens in both the House and the Senate, but that the effects are small.
In the context of the ONP, discussions of its support base have drawn on both economic insecurity and attitudes towards race and immigration, although the latter seem to have been more significant than the former at the 1998 election (Charnock 1999; Goot and Watson 2001; McAllister and Bean 2000) . The position at the 1998 election with regard to postmaterialism was, as noted by Western and Tranter (2001) , rather unusual inasmuch as ONP voters were also disproportionately postmaterialist.
Analysis in Ellis (2001, 2003) also demonstrates this and suggests that the probable explanation lies in measurement flaws with the 4-item postmaterialism measure used in the 1998 Australian Election Study (AES), as argued in another context by Warwick (1998) . Ellis (2001, 2003) consequently also develop a broader index of postmodern attitudes in line with Inglehart's more recent work and use it and an index of Left-Right attitudes to explore the structure of the Australian party system. The findings show a structure which is broadly consistent not only with Inglehart's recent work but also that of Kitschelt (1994 Kitschelt ( , 1995 in relation to party competition in Europe.
The most important features of this are that a single Left-Right dimension is inadequate to describe the structure, but that the practical political impact of the additional dimension is not independent of the Left-Right dimension. The resulting correlation between attitudes on the two dimensions has strategic consequences for parties, since it constrains their room for independent movement on issue positions related to the two dimensions.
However, it is of course possible that the structure observed in 1998 (or at least some of its important aspects) was particular to that election, especially since that was the first federal election contested by the ONP. The highly charged context in which the 2001 election occurred provides an excellent opportunity to examine the stability of the structure, since the apparently salient issues in relation to terrorism and asylum-seekers were very different from the GST-related ones in 1998. Consequently, our initial aim in this article is to study how closely the structure was replicated at the 2001 election. If the structure is stable, our next aim is to discuss the strategic consequences for the various parties of this structure.
In the course of studying the stability of the structure, we also take the opportunity to address some of the measurement aspects of Inglehart's very widely used postmaterialism indices. This is possible because the 2001 AES incorporated the full 12-item battery rather than just the 4-item version which showed the anomalous results for the ONP when it was asked in the 1998 AES.
Data and Measures
Our analyses are based on data from the 2001 AES (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002) 1 and we follow Blount (1998) and Ellis (2001, 2003) in studying the Senate vote. This is partly because the multi-member, quota-preferential voting system in the Senate is more 'minor-party friendly' because of its more proportional outcomes than the House of Representatives (which makes it more likely that changes to the structure of the party system will be apparent there first), and also because there is greater consistency in choice offered to voters in the Senate. 2 In the House, voters in each electoral division not only possibly face constituency-specific issues and personalities, but also not all parties offer candidates in every contest.
Left-Right Economic Ideology
With the questions available in the 2001 AES and in keeping with the measure used in Ellis (2001, 2003) , we formed an index 3 based both on individual self-placement on a Left-Right scale and also on responses to some relevant individual questions (see Table 1 ). At the core of this index is the notion that the Left-Right division reflects conflicting economic interests centring on the ownership of the means of production and distribution of income. The index was scaled to have a range of values from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating extreme Left-wing and 1 indicating extreme Right-wing.
Postmaterialism
Increasing demands for political expression and participation are seen as key indicators of Inglehart's concept of postmaterial values emphasising self-expression. He contrasts these values with those prioritising more materialist concerns with the nation's economic management and physical security. Although the measurement and interpretation of postmaterialism are topics of some controversy in the political science and other literature (see, for example, Clarke et al 1999; Davis and Davenport 1999; Inglehart and Abramson 1999) , there are two standard measures of postmaterialism (see the Appendix for details). The first (which was the earliest one used) is based on a single ranking exercise, with four national aims (two materialist and two postmaterialist) from which to select. The second is based on three such questions, making a total battery of 12 items. The 4-item battery results in classifications of survey respondents as 'materialist', 'postmaterialist', or 'mixed'. The standard way of aggregating this figure by group (party, country, etc) is to cite the difference between the percentage of postmaterialists and the percentage of materialists (eg Inglehart 1997, 136) . As outlined in the Appendix, the 12-item battery results in a score ranging from 0 (completely materialist) to 5 (completely postmaterialist) (Inglehart 1997, 130) . Inglehart (see, for example, Inglehart 1997, 145, 151) seems to prefer to aggregate this in a similar manner to the one used for the 4-item battery and cites the difference between the percentages of 'high' postmaterialists (scores of 3 or more) and 'low' postmaterialists (score of 0). We have chosen to cite mean scores instead (though we found in our analyses that the two approaches actually resulted in very similar interpretations).
The choice of rival aims offered in the 4-item battery (used in the 1998 AES) is as follows (with the first and third aims regarded as materialist):
• maintaining order in the nation;
• giving people more say in important government decisions; THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM 427
• fighting rising prices;
• protecting freedom of speech. Warwick (1998) argues that the 4-item measure is actually revealing a 'prodemocracy' orientation. The finding Ellis 2001, 2003) that ONP voters in 1998 were disproportionately postmaterialist by this measure seems to bear this out. In the Australian context at the time, ONP voters were often characterised as anti-elite, feeling left out of the Australian political and economic landscape, and opponents of 'political correctness' as a form of implicit censorship of 'ordinary Australians', and it is perhaps unsurprising that many were inclined to believe that the second and fourth of the aims were important ones for Australia. The different electoral context in 2001, however, might well lead to different choices for the most important aims. If so, the dependence of the 4-item measure on context would provide another argument against its validity. One would expect, however, that the 12-item measure would be more robust.
Postmodernism
While Inglehart (1997) argues that the postmodern dimension of politics he identifies is strongly associated with the postmaterialism-materialism divide, he does also recognise that a broader consideration of postmodern politics will sometimes be necessary. Because of the above-mentioned anomalous results provided for the ONP in 1998 by the 4-item postmaterialism measure, Ellis (2001, 2003) use this broader approach to study the party system structure at the 1998 election.
As many readers will be aware, terms relating to postmodernism often have different and competing meanings (cf Gibbins and Reimer 1999) and, unlike in the case of postmaterialism, Inglehart does not have a standard operationalisation of postmodernism. Consequently, the most natural approach to develop ours is by basing it directly on key aspects involved in his suggested new dimension. Inglehart (1997, 237) argues that a key implication of the reorientation toward postmodern values is a shift in political cleavages based on class conflict toward cleavages based on cultural issues and quality-of-life concerns. Postmodernisation is associated with increasing levels of interpersonal trust, tolerance and permissiveness and a de-emphasis on all kinds of authority, whether religious or secular, in favour of individual pursuit of subjective well-being (1997, 74) . As previously noted, postmodern values have been associated with the increasing prioritisation of a range of issues, such as environmental protection, abortion, ethnic diversity, women's issues, and gay and lesbian emancipation (Inglehart 1997, 4, 132, 237, 246) .
Accordingly, drawing on the data available in the 2001 AES, and giving specific attention to the importance of Aboriginal issues in the Australian context, we followed the approach adopted in Ellis (2001, 2003) and created five indices (see below) to measure individuals' positions on permissiveness, xenophobia, rights for minority or oppressed groups and environmental priorities (see Table  2 ). As with the Left-Right economic ideology index, each index was scaled to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the most postmodern stance.
An implication of Inglehart's ideas is that attitudes towards these kinds of issues Importance of equality between men and women Very important actually flow from a fairly coherent underlying value orientation and so, if Inglehart's thesis is correct, these attitudes should to a reasonable degree be able to be summarised in a single dimension. 4 Accordingly, in addition to looking at the five indices separately, we can also calculate a single 'postmodern attitudes' index, based on all 25 questions. It then becomes an empirical question as to whether using the five separate indices adds anything of significance to our understanding of voting behaviour, when compared to using the single combined postmodern attitudes index.
Given the context of the 2001 election, we also investigated the significance of attitudes to defence/security issues and cultural pluralism. The corresponding indices are shown in Table 3 . 5 The inclusion of E4ASYLUM in the Pluralism index (rather than in the Defence one) is perhaps surprising, but is justified by factor analyses that show this is where it is better placed. It seems that, in this context, asylum-seekers are seen as 'queue jumpers' and as breaking a norm of Australian culture, rather than as a security threat along the same lines as terrorism. Our data analyses proceed as follows. We begin by examining the location of parties' voters at the 2001 election in the two-dimensional spaces formed by linking Left-Right attitudes to each of the two postmaterialism measures and the combined postmodern attitudes index. Following this, we use multinomial logistic regression to estimate various models relating vote in 2001 to the various attitudinal indices. Finally, we study the attitudinal consistency of the voters for the various parties.
Results and Discussion
Before moving to consider the impact on voting, we briefly consider the overall association between the Left-Right index and the postmaterialism and the combined postmodern attitudes indices. In line with the argument outlined earlier, these show fairly strong negative relationships, with a correlation coefficient of-0.42 between the Left-Right index and the postmodern attitudes index, and one of-0.40 between the Left-Right index and the 12-item postmaterialism measure. In other words, those who have more postmodern attitudes or are more postmaterialist also have a tendency to be more Left-wing.
It is not surprising that this association between attitudes at the level of individual voters is also reflected in the average positioning of voters for the various parties. Figure 1 shows the relationship for each party's Senate voters between their mean score on the Left-Right index and the relative balance of postmaterialists and materialists (based on the 4-item measure). Figure 2 is similar, but with the 4-item postmaterialism measure replaced by the mean postmaterialism score based on the 12-item measure. An examination of these figures reveals that in 2001 both showed essentially the same features, with the overall pattern of the relationship between Left-Right attitudes and postmaterialism being similar to the diagonal structure in comparable two-dimensional attitudinal space found in Europe by Kitschelt (1995) and mentioned above.
This positioning of parties' voters is quite significant. First, it supports Inglehart's more recent argument (following Kitschelt) that the practical impact of the 'new politics' dimension is not orthogonal to the more traditional Left-Right dimension (see, for example, Inglehart 1997, 246) . Second, it suggests that it might 430 D. CHARNOCK AND P. ELLIS be useful to regard party competition as now taking place along a new axis, but one which is located within a two-dimensional space (as opposed to descriptions locating competition along a single Left-Right dimension). It is clear, for instance, that describing the ONP as a 'far Right' party (as is very commonly done) is a quite inadequate way of understanding its support and can only serve to mislead. Its supporters were, in fact, more centrist on average in terms of Left-Right attitudes in 2001 than were those of either the Liberal or National parties-and this was also the case in 1998 Ellis 2001, 2003) . By both measures they were also somewhat less materialist than Coalition voters.
On these two dimensions, there was essentially no difference between Liberal and National Senate voters in 2001. Democrat voters occupy a slightly Left-of-centre position on economic issues but are somewhat more postmaterialist than ALP supporters. Greens voters are both the most postmaterialist and also the most Left-wing party, and the Greens are better described as a Left-libertarian party than by Inglehart's depiction of postmaterialists who have little interest in classic Left redistributive agendas (Inglehart 1997, 246) .
As noted earlier, an important consequence of the correlation between attitudes on the two dimensions is that it reduces the capacity of parties to treat them independently. A recent example is the negative reaction from members of the Greens party that followed after Greens' Senator Bob Brown made the suggestion that further privatisation of Telstra might be acceptable provided some of the proceeds were used for appropriate environmental uses. As far as the stability over time of the structure is concerned, the 4-item measure demonstrates many similarities with 1998 (see Charnock and Ellis 2003, figure 2 ), but also a number of significant differences. As mentioned above, perhaps the main difference is that, unlike in 2001, the measure quite counterintuitively showed ONP voters as being disproportionately postmaterialist in 1998, but another noticeable aspect was that the measure also showed almost as many postmaterialists as materialists among Liberal and National voters in 1998, in contrast to 2001.
Both of these facts reinforce the argument that the 4-item measure does not always measure what it is intended to. Since the 12-item battery was not asked in the 1998 AES, however, there is no point of comparison for the more extensive measure of postmaterialism. Therefore, in order to obtain some evidence about the stability of the structure of party competition between 1998 and 2001 based on something more reliable than the 4-item postmaterialism measure, in Figure 3 we show the results of regarding the second relevant dimension as a postmodern attitudes one, along the lines of Inglehart's more recent work. Figure 3 does, in fact, reveal a structure that is similar both to that revealed in Figure 2 by the 12-item postmaterialism measure and also to a comparable analysis of a postmodern attitudes index for the 1998 election (Charnock and Ellis 2003) . It seems, therefore, that the structure of party competition at the two elections was quite stable, and below we examine some of the implications of this structure. Here, we simply note the very important feature that differences between ALP and coalition voters are defined mainly by the Left-Right dimension, although there are also some smaller differences between them in terms of the postmaterialism/postmodern attitudes dimension. 
Individual Voting Models
Up to this point, we have used graphical representations of party competition. We now extend our analyses by estimating models that relate individual voting to the various indices. We include the same models as in Charnock and Ellis (2003) , and also add some others that use the 12-item postmaterialism measure. In addition to a null model (to obtain a baseline for assessing the other models), we present complete details of six models: one with only the Left Examination of these models allows us to assess not only the relative importance of Left-Right, postmaterialism and postmodern attitudes, but also whether studies using the five separate indices add much over those using only the single postmodern index.
We use multinomial logistic modelling (see, for example, Long 1997). In this form of modelling, one category of the dependent variable is set as a reference category. As above, we study the Senate vote, and we make the Liberal vote the reference category. We can then meaningfully separate Liberal from National voters, and thus examine differences between the two Coalition partners-something that is not often done in Australian voting analyses. Tables 4-10 show the results of our main models (null and models A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 and C as outlined above). Numbers without parentheses are the estimates of the size of the logit coefficient compared to Liberal voters; numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. Hence, a coefficient that is statistically significantly different from zero indicates significant evidence of a difference from the Liberals on the corresponding attitudinal index.
A negative coefficient for the 'Left-Right economic' variable indicates that Left-wing voters are more likely to vote for that party than for the Liberals; a negative coefficient for the various postmaterialism and postmodern indices indicates that postmaterialist or postmodern voters, respectively, are less likely to vote for that party than for the Liberals. Coefficients should be interpreted as showing the association between the variable and vote once the other variables in that THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM 433 Table  9 (model B2), we see that, having controlled for Left-Right economic position (for which being more Left-wing increases the odds of voting for the ONP rather than the Liberals), having postmodern attitudes decreases the odds of voting ONP compared to the Liberals. The initial models (A1, A2 and A3) essentially confirm the picture of party support differentiation previously obtained from Figures 1, 2 and 3 , but they also demonstrate (by comparison of the measures of model fit with those from the null model) that the association between voting and the Left-Right economic index is overall of more significance than is that with the postmaterialism or postmodern indices (though these, also, are certainly of importance).
For example, including only the Left-Right index (model A1) reduces AIC 6 by 545, whereas including only the postmaterialism 12-item measure (model A2) reduces AIC by just over half as much (331), and including only the postmodern attitudes index (model A3) reduces AIC by 404. However, both dimensions are important: including both reduces AIC by a total of 682 (model B1) or 775 (model B2) from the null model. In 1998, in contrast, a model that included only postmaterialism (based on the 4-item battery) as an explanatory variable resulted in a very small reduction in AIC over the null model of only 14. On the other hand, the postmodern attitudes index also gave a large reduction in AIC in 1998, although somewhat less than in 2001 (Charnock and Ellis 2003) . The coefficient estimates also clearly show that the Left-Right economic dimension continues to be primary for differentiating the ALP and Liberal parties from each other. Separating the postmodern index into its five sub-indices (model C) does enhance the model compared to model B2, although the extra improvement in model fit is overall relatively small. There is an extra reduction in AIC of 72 compared to the single postmodern attitudes index, indicating that the addition of the single, combined postmodern index captures most of the improvement by itself. Nevertheless, there are other detailed differences between some of the parties that are apparent when the five sub-indices are included, and some of these are of interest because they enable a finer-grained picture to be obtained. 7 For example:
• Although there was a general tendency for being more postmodern to increase the chances of voting ALP compared to Liberal, the opposite was the case for attitudes towards immigrants when the other attitudes are controlled for. This was also true at the 1998 election, thus reinforcing for the ALP the dilemma (observed in Charnock 1997) that results from the fact that Asian migrants in particular give them disproportionate support.
• In 2001, being more postmodern had an overall tendency to increase the chances of voting Australian Democrats rather than Liberal, and the same was also true in 2001 at the level of each of the sub-indices separately. Compared to the ALP, being economically more Right-wing and more supportive of environmental issues, more culturally permissive and more favourably inclined towards immigrants also significantly increase the chances of voting Democrat.
• Once the other attitudes are controlled for, the impact on voting of attitudes towards immigrants and EEO does not differentiate between Green and Liberal voters. On the surface this may seem surprising, but appears to be a stable feature since it was also true in 1998. The strand in Green thought that links environmental pressure with population growth and immigration may be important here.
• Compared to voting Liberal or National, being more economically Left-wing significantly increases the chances of voting for the ONP, but has the opposite effect on the chances of voting for the ONP compared to voting for the ALP.
• In descending order of size, having postmodern attitudes towards immigrants and Aboriginal issues significantly decrease the chances of voting for the ONP compared to Liberal. The same is also the case for voting ONP compared with voting ALP. In addition to the Left-Right difference noted above, the main differentiating factors in voting ONP rather than National are significantly more negative attitudes towards immigrants and Aborigines.
Whether focusing on the separate sub-indices or on the combined index, a major conclusion from these models is that either a postmaterialism or postmodern political dimension is of importance in helping understand the Senate vote. Interestingly, the position of ONP voters in 2001 is still shown as being more postmaterialist than that of Coalition voters, though the difference is much smaller than in 1998. The broader measure of postmodern attitudes, however, shows ONP voters as having the least postmodern attitudes.
Which of the two conceptualisations of the second dimension is more useful could be a matter of debate. Statistically, however, the postmodern attitudes index improves model fit more than does either of the two postmaterialism measures. Decomposing the postmodern political dimension into five subcomponents allows an even finer characterisation of differences between parties.
The attitudinal positions of voters for different parties on the various individual indices (including defence and pluralism) can also be depicted separately in graphical form, as in Figure 4 . Despite their apparent contextual importance at the 2001 election, it is clear from this diagram that the defence and cultural pluralism indices add little to the picture of party competition obtained from the other attitudinal sub-indices. The ordering of party voters (other than on the Left-Right index) is, in almost all cases, Green → Democrat → ALP → Liberal/National → ONP.
Attitudinal Consistency, Distances between Parties and Strategic Implications
From a strategic point of view, although the picture we have been able to draw up to this point is certainly very useful for differentiating between the parties, it is THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM 437 essentially based on average attitudinal positions. Another interesting and practically important issue is to examine how much attitudinal variation is present among the voters for each party, and how large are the average distances between the parties' voters. To the extent that the attitudes being studied here are those that have an impact on voting behaviour, we can use this information as a guide to how much scope there is for parties to attract voters from (or lose voters to) other parties. It also gives a rather more precise indication of what we might describe as parties with the most 'closely ideologically aligned' supporters. Since our multinomial logistic modelling has shown that using the five separate postmodern sub-indices (model C) improves model fit by a relatively small amount compared to the model (B2) with the Left-Right economic attitudes index and the combined postmodern attitudes indices, we reduce complexity by restricting ourselves to examining the two-dimensional space formed by the Left-Right and postmodern attitudes' indices. This also has the advantage of allowing us to make visual comparisons.
The inner and outer contour lines in Figure 5 enclose 40% and 80%, respectively, of the estimated population voting for each party. 8 We have inserted the axes around a central point (0.5, 0.5) in order to more readily make visual distinctions between Left-and Right-wing voters, and between more or less postmodern voters.
It is immediately obvious that there is a considerable degree of crossover between the supporters of the various parties, despite the degree of separation between the centres of density for each party previously indicated in Figure 3 (and Figures 1 and 2 when using the two postmaterialism measures). This is, of course, important because it gives rise to potential vote switching between parties.
As in 1998, the general pattern is for the core of voters for all parties to have quite coherent attitudes, but for this to be less so for remaining voters (much less so for Democrat and Green voters especially). Considering the two-dimensional space overall, the most internally consistent attitudes were held by voters for the two Coalition parties, closely followed by ONP and the ALP, while voters for the Greens and Democrats clearly did not have attitudes that were as consistent as those of other parties. Refining this by examining the two dimensions separately, the conclusions are only slightly different. The Greens are differentiated from the Democrats by being the least consistent on both dimensions, whereas Democrat voters are about as consistent as ONP and ALP voters on the Left-Right dimension. As was the case overall, Coalition voters were the most consistent on each of the dimensions considered separately.
One interesting finding here is that the attitudes of ONP voters were overall more consistent than the Greens and Democrats and were, in fact, a little more consistent than those of ALP voters. Again, to the extent that these attitudes are significant in determining voting behaviour, the position of the ALP seems slightly weaker than the Liberals, though the extent of the intra-party variations for most of the parties is fairly large. Although not shown here, a more detailed numerical analysis of intra-and inter-party average distances confirmed that, as was also the case in 1998 (Charnock and Ellis 2003) , voters for the more Right-wing parties (Liberals, Nationals and ONP) were more ideologically coherent in 2001 than those voting for the other parties (ALP, Democrats, Greens).
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Conclusion
Most of the conclusions we draw from our analyses apply to both the 1998 and 2001 elections, although a few are particular to 2001. In the case of the former, for example, our analyses clearly demonstrate that in both 1998 and 2001 a single Left-Right economic dimension was insufficient to adequately describe voter differences between Australian parties, although it does remain the main aspect dividing ALP from Liberal Party voters.
Whether we choose to conceptualise the second required dimension in terms of postmaterialist attitudes or the somewhat broader postmodern attitudes is not a matter of enormous empirical consequence in 2001 since both result in fairly similar descriptions of the patterns of party competition, with just a few differences (especially in relation to the ONP). This is unlike the situation in 1998, when the 4-item postmaterialism measure incongruously showed ONP voters to be disproportionately quite postmaterialist, suggesting to us (as to several other writers) that it is too contextually bound 9 to be a reliable measure of postmaterialism. The 12-item postmaterialism measure was not asked in the 1998 AES, so we cannot draw any conclusion from this analysis about its reliability; on the surface, however, it would seem unlikely that it would be as unreliable in measuring postmaterialism as the simpler 4-item measure.
In both 1998 and 2001, it was the Left-Right dimension that was of more overall importance as far as measures of model fit are concerned; this is largely a consequence of the above-noted fact that it is this dimension that serves primarily to differentiate between the two largest blocs of voters, those for the ALP and the Liberal Party. However, rather than considering the two dimensions separately, it might be more advantageous to consider the structure from another perspective, with our findings at both elections indicating the existence of a new axis of party competition. This axis, though, appears as a diagonal line in the two-dimensional attitudinal space, much as in Kitschelt's description of the structure of European party competition and not dissimilarly to Inglehart's more recent arguments.
Breaking the postmodern attitudes index down into its subcomponents gives an even more detailed picture of differentiation of voter support, particularly between the minor parties, although for the reason mentioned above it does not add a great deal in terms of improvement in measures of overall model fit.
Although the two elections occurred in very different contexts (one very much focused on the proposed GST and the other apparently strongly influenced by considerations of international terrorism and the issue of asylum-seekers in the context of the MV Tampa incident), our analyses show that the structure of party competition was very similar at both Senate elections. The correlation between attitudes on the two dimensions that is indicated by this structure places constraints on the ability of parties to adopt issue positions relevant to the two dimensions independently of each other. These constraints will undoubtedly continue to prove awkward to deal with at times, most obviously for the major parties.
To us, this suggests that the strategic nature of the Australian party system has now developed to a point where the competition offers far more complex possibilities. Although the vote for the ONP dropped between 1998 and 2001 (from 9.0% to 5.5% in the Senate and from 8.4% to 4.3% in the House of Representatives), it is nevertheless plausible that there is a medium-term place for it (or another similar party) in the party system-provided, of course, that it (or a similar party) can achieve a degree of organisational stability. There are significant amounts of intra-party variation in attitudes. As a result, there are quite large degrees of overlap between the voters for the various parties, again opening up the possibility of vote-switching between parties. In this regard, we found in both 1998 and 2001 that the greatest degree of internal coherence was to be found among the three more Right-wing parties (Liberal, National, ONP), which would seem to be a factor tending to give them a firmer support base.
In thinking about the impact of the structure of the system it is, of course, important to remember that changes in issue positioning by one party have an effect on others and that the behaviour of all parties influences what is feasible for the others. Nevertheless, at both elections, we found a rough clustering of voters into two camps: one (Greens, Australian Democrats, ALP) more Left-wing and more postmodern and the other (Liberal, National, ONP) more Right-wing and less postmodern. This finding gives added significance to the question of whether or not the Coalition parties should direct high-order preferences towards the ONP (or a similar party). This clearly requires very careful consideration on the part of the Liberals and Nationals and also might be seen to have a bearing on another related issue, that of whether the Liberals and Nationals should formally amalgamate. It would, though, seem to be a rather risky strategy to end up with a single party to replace what is currently a three-party cluster.
In tactical terms, the parallels between the two camps are not complete. The ALP is not the most Left-wing of its 'cluster', whereas both the Liberals and Nationals are more Right-wing than the ONP. This places the ONP (with the more centrist average economic views of its supporters) in a different position from the Greens, for example, since the ONP has the potential to act as a 'bridge' between the ALP and the Coalition parties. It also means, of course, that ALP support can be subject to attrition from two directions, with the Greens attracting some of their more Left-wing and postmodern voters if the ALP adopts policy positions to shore up its support among more Right-wing and less postmodern voters. Preferential voting methods might be helpful in recovering some of these losses at later stages of vote counting, but indefinitely relying on this seems to be inherently risky. In the medium to long term, it would presumably be better to aim both to move public opinion to positions more congenial to the ALP and also to attempt to adopt strategies to fragment the voting support of the more Right-wing parties.
Our analysis is also relevant to debates over the positioning of the Australian Democrats, since the location of the main density of voters in the two-dimensional attitudinal space does not seem conducive to the long-term presence of two parties to the Left of the ALP. The fact that Democrat voters were more consistent than Green voters on the Left-Right dimension is another relevant consideration here. However, regardless of the debates about where particular parties should position themselves, one thing that is clear is that the strategic complexity of the Australian party system has increased and that future federal politicians seem certain to be condemned to 'live in interesting times'.
Appendix
Postmaterialism Indices
One of Inglehart's two materialism-postmaterialism indices (used in the earliest research) is based on a 4-item battery; the other index is based on a 12-item battery, which consists of three separate ranking exercises, the second of which is effectively the 4-item battery (Inglehart 1997, 355) . Each of the ranking exercises is prefaced with the question:
There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?
The options for the first question are: 'maintaining a high level of economic growth; making sure that this country has strong defence forces; seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities; trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful'.
The options for the second question (which is effectively the 4-item battery) are: 'maintaining order in the nation; giving people more say in important government decisions; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech'.
The options in the third question are: 'having a stable economy; progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society; the fight against crime; progress towards a society in which ideas count more than money'.
From the 12-item battery, a postmaterialism index is created from the number of the six options chosen which are postmaterialist rather than materialist-the distinction should be fairly obvious to the reader, except in the case of 'trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful', which Inglehart does not include on the side of postmaterialism because of low correlation with the other postmaterialist options, apparently tapping instead into fears about urban crime. Consequently, Inglehart does not include this item in his postmaterialist index, which thus ranges from 0 (completely materialist) to 5 (chose all the available postmaterialist options).
In the 2001 AES, the 4-item battery was asked as the first of the three sets of four responses, as compared to the second set (as outlined above). We assume that this should make comparisons of the 4-item measure between the 1998 AES (when it was the only set asked) and the 2001 AES more reliable than if Inglehart's ordering had been used.
Odds Ratio Changes Presentation of Model C
An alternative presentation of the results of multinomial logistic regression models is based on odds ratios. Since this involves comparisons of all pairs of parties, it generates large sets of numbers and so we give such a presentation only for our most complex model (C) (see Table A1 ). Table A1 shows, for each pair of parties, the proportional change in the voting odds for an increase of 0.1 in the indicated index. Two examples illustrate how the table can be interpreted: first, moving 0.1 along the economic index to the right will increase the odds of voting Liberal rather than Labor by about two and one quarter-fold (2.24 times) over what they would have been otherwise; second, moving 0.1 in the postmodern direction of the permissiveness index will reduce the odds of voting Liberal rather than Green to three-quarters (0.75 times) what they would have been otherwise. 
